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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Terriann

Jenkins

appeals

from

her

conviction

for

possession

of

methamphetamine, asserting that the district court erred in denying her motion to
suppress evidence.

Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
On April 5, 2010, at approximately 3:23 in the morning, Officer Doerr observed a
vehicle driving slowly down an alleyway. (R., p.17; 1 Tr., Vol. 1, 2 p.19, Ls.11-17.) After
following the vehicle for a time, he watched it make an abrupt change in its direction,
and requested dispatch to run a check on the vehicle's license plate. (R., p.17, Tr., Vol.
I, p.19, Ls.21-22.) The car was registered to Terriann Jenkins in Wendell, Idaho. (Tr.,
Vol. I, p.21, Ls.2-7.) Officer Doerr personally knew Jenkins from contacts during 2003,
2004, and 2005 and knew she had resided in the area. (R., p.17; Tr., Vol. I, p.21, Ls.816.) Officer Doerr recognized Jenkins as the individual who was driving the vehicle.
(R., p.17; Tr., Vol. I, p.25, Ls.6-19.) He asked dispatch to run a check on her driver's

license. (Tr., Vol. I, p.21, Ls.17-23.) Dispatch reported that Jenkins' Idaho license had
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The probable cause affidavit, encompassing pages 16-23 of the Record, was
included in the State's initial discovery and admitted at the Suppression Hearing as part
of State's Exhibit 1. (See Tr., Vol. I, p.4, L.24 - p.5, L.21.)
2

There are multiple volumes of transcripts from the proceedings below.
Conforming to Appellant's brief, "Tr., Vol. I" in the State's brief refers to the transcript
from the motion to suppress hearing held on July 20, 2010. Likewise, "Tr., Vol. II" refers
to the volume of transcripts from the change of plea hearing held on July 20, 2010, and
the sentencing hearing held on September 28, 2010.
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Officer Doerr activated his emergency lights and enforced a traffic stop.

(R.,

p.17; Tr., Vol. I, p.25, Ls.1-5.) Jenkins was unable to provide a valid driver's license.
(R., p.17; Tr., Vol. I, p.26, L.10 - p.27, L.5.) As Officer Doerr approached her vehicle
with his service dog, Jenkins voluntarily exited her vehicle and consented to a search of
the car. (R., p.17.) She took a plate of food covered in tinfoil and a metal spoon out of
the car.

(R., p.17.)

Officer Doerr noticed that the spoon was coated with a white

crystalline residue and dried cotton swabs.

(R., p.17.)

Officer Doerr presented the

spoon to his service dog and the dog alerted. (R., p.17.) The residue was tested and
came back positive for methamphetamine. (R., p.18.)
The State charged Jenkins with possession of methamphetamine in violation of
I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1). (R., pp.37-38.) Jenkins filed a motion

to

suppress, alleging that

the officer lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to support the traffic stop.
pp.68-71.)

(R.,

After holding a hearing on Jenkins' motion, the district court denied her

motion to suppress. (R., p.90.)
Jenkins entered a conditional guilty plea pursuant to a plea agreement in which
the State agreed

to

recommend a suspended unified sentence of five years with two

years fixed, with three years of probation, and Jenkins reserved the right

to

appeal the

denial of her suppression motion, and to appeal her sentence if it exceeded the State's
recommendations. (R., pp.92-102; Tr., Vol. II, p.5, L. 17 - p.8, L 14.) The district court
entered a judgment of conviction and, consistent with the State's recommendations,
imposed a unified sentence of five years with two years fixed, but suspended the
sentence and placed Jenkins on probation for three years. (R., pp.126-31.) Jenkins
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.137-39.)
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ISSUE
Jenkins states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Jenkins' motion to suppress
the State's evidence?
(Appellant's brief, p.9.)
The State rephrases the issue as:
Has Jenkins failed to establish error in the district court's denial of her motion to
suppress evidence?
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ARGUMENT
Jenkins Has Failed To Establish Error In The District Court's Denial Of Her Motion To
Suppress Evidence
A.

Introduction
"Mindful of the standards attendant on the district court's review for whether there

was reasonable, articulable suspicion to support a traffic stop," Jenkins nonetheless
asserts that the district court erred in denying her suppression motion.

(Appellant's

brief, pp.10-11.) Jenkins' claim fails. She has failed to establish either clear error in the
district court's findings of fact or error in the application of law to those facts.

B.

Standard Of Review
'The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, [the Court] accept[s] the trial court's findings of
fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but ... freely review[s] the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found." State v. Faith, 141 Idaho 728, 729-30,
117 P.3d 142, 143-44 (Ct. App. 2005). At a suppression hearing, the power to assess
the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual
inferences is vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897
P.2d 993, 997 (1995).

C.

Officer Doerr Had Sufficient Reasonable Suspicion To Enforce A Traffic Stop
A routine traffic stop by a police officer constitutes a seizure of the vehicle's

occupants and implicates the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979); State v.

Flowers, 131 Idaho 205, 208, 953 P.2d 645, 648 {Ct. App. 1998). Because a routine
4

traffic stop is normally limited in scope and duration, it is more analogous to an
investigative detention than a custodial arrest and therefore is analyzed under the
principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653-54.
Under Terry, an officer may lawfully stop a suspect for investigative purposes only when
the officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime. Terry, 392 U.S. at 30; State v. DuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 552-53, 961
P.2d 641, 643-44 (1998).
Reasonable suspicion must be more than a mere hunch; it must be based on
specific articulable facts and the rational inferences that naturally follow from those
facts. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 896-97, 821 P.2d 949,
951-52 (1991). To justify the officer's detention of a defendant, the State is not required
to prove the defendant's guilt on the underlying offense. State v. Kimball, 141 Idaho
489, 492-93, 111 P.3d 625, 638-39 (Ct. App. 2005); State v. Hollon, 136 Idaho 499,
502, 36 P.3d 1287, 1291 (Ct. App. 2001).

Rather, the reasonableness of the police

officer's suspicion is evaluated based upon the totality of the circumstances at the time
of the seizure.

United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981); State v.

Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930, 932, 829 P.2d 520, 522 (1992); State v. Schumacher, 136
Idaho 509, 515, 37 P.3d 6, 12 (Ct. App. 2001 ).
The facts are not contested in this case. Officer Doerr followed a car down a
darkened alleyway at night during his routine patrol.

(Tr., Vol. I, p.19, Ls.11-17.)

Suspicious of criminal activity, he requested that dispatch run a check on the vehicle's
Idaho license plate. (Tr., Vol. I, p.20, Ls.17-24.) The license plate came back as validly
registered to Jenkins, and reflected an address in Wendell, Idaho.
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(Tr., Vol. I, p.21,

Ls.2-7.) Officer Doerr personally knew Jenkins from contacts during 2003, 2004, and
2005 and knew she had resided in the area. (Tr., Vol. I, p.21, Ls.8-16.) Officer Doerr
recognized Jenkins as the individual who was driving the vehicle. (Tr., Vol. I, p.25, Ls.619.) He asked dispatch to run her Idaho driver's license. (Tr., Vol. I, p.21, Ls.17-23.) It
came back expired since 2004. (Tr., Vol. I, p.23, Ls.1-4.)
Idaho Code § 49-301 provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person, except those
expressly exempted by the provisions of this chapter, shall drive any motor vehicle upon
a highway unless the person has a current and valid Idaho driver's license." I.C. § 49301 (1 ). Based on the totality of the circumstances known to Officer Doerr at the time of
the traffic stop, he had reasonable, articulable suspicion that Jenkins was driving in
violation of Idaho's licensing requirements in I.C. § 49-301, and was therefore justified in
pulling her over.
In her motion below, Jenkins seemed to argue that the officer lacked sufficient
cause to justify the traffic stop because she, in fact, possessed a valid Michigan
chauffeur's license. (See R., pp.69-71.) On appeal, Jenkins has correctly noted that
the State is not required to prove actual guilt of the underlying offense to justify the
seizure. (Appellant's brief, p.11; see also Hollon, 136 Idaho at 502, 36 P.3d at 1291.) A
mistake of fact made by police officers in the field is permissible if it is a mistake that a
reasonable person might make by acting on the information known to the officer at the
time of the seizure. Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 803-804 (1971 ); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949). The officer must also subjectively believe the truth of
the fact he is mistaken about. Kimball, 141 Idaho at 493, 111 P.3d at 639. Because
Jenkins was driving a vehicle with an Idaho license plate, with a valid Idaho registration,
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with an Idaho address, and the officer had numerous prior contacts with Jenkins in
Idaho, Officer Doerr's subjective belief that if Jenkins was licensed she would be
licensed in Idaho was a reasonable inference that naturally followed from those facts. It
would be unreasonable, given the facts known to the officer at the time of the traffic
stop, to expect him to anticipate that Jenkins would be licensed in Michigan.
For all the above reasons, the district court correctly denied Jenkins' motion to
suppress evidence and its judgment should be affirmed.

CONCLUSION
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's denial of
Jenkins' motion to suppress evidence.

DATED this 12th day of August, 2011.

Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 12th day of August 2011, served a true and
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed
to:
SARAH E. TOMPKINS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.
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